Empiricists say “Yay sensation!”.
Rationalists say “Yay intellect!”.
Empiricists say “What is left of contact with anything short of sensation?”
Rationalists say “What is left short of chaos with anything short of thought?”
That I sense and think is more clear to me than how or by what powers. That I do either or both is more clear to me than how or by what material. So, both presuppose action. And action presupposes life. Presuppositional requirements for what is certain cannot be debated without folly and contradiction.
Can I doubt whether I am alive or acting? I cannot without presupposing them. So, I cannot in reality even if I can psychologically (not in reality).
It is in this sense that I think even though the Rationalists have not always framed things correctly, they win. Descartes is a good example. In order to think or sense I must exist and there must be an object to think or sense. So, activity presupposes the subject and object. Doubting is an activity. Thus, I cannot doubt my own existence (as doubter) or the existence of another which I doubt the characterization of (object doubted).
The Rationalist tends to locate such presusppositional knowledge in “the mind”. I am not opposed to such reification. But, I prefer minding (action) over mind (thing). By avoiding the conversion of the activity of minding into the thing responsible for it I avoid all kinds of questions about the characterizations of that in which the presupposition is stored. May I store the presuppositions in an activity? I need not permission (only because I have homesteaded this particular body). And mining is something I am much surer of than the mind.